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Empirical evidence to identify factors that are responsible for the sluggish development 
of bond and capital markets in Pakistan remains scanty. This paper is a step forward in this 
direction. Specifically, this paper draws on the recent developments in the area of law and 
finance to formulate several propositions on how judicial efficiency can have a differential 
impact on corporate capital structures of small and large firms. These propositions are tested 
using data of 370 firms listed at the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) and 27 districts high courts 
of Pakistan. The results indicate that leverage ratio decreases, when judicial efficiency 
decreases; however, this relationship is not statistically significant. This is due to the 
composition effect. Allowing judicial efficiency to interact with the included explanatory 
variables, the results show that worsening judicial efficiency increases leverage ratios of large 
firms and decreases leverage ratios of small firms, which is an indication of the fact that 
creditors shift credit away from small firms to large firms in the presence of inefficient judicial 
system. Results also indicate that the effect of inefficient courts is greater on leverage ratios of 
firms that have fewer tangible assets as percentage of total assets than on leverage ratios of 
firms that have more tangible assets. The results indicate that under inefficient judicial system 
creditors reduce their lending to small firms and firms with little collateral and redistribute the 
credit to large firms. This is why judicial inefficiency does not change volume of credit, but 
changes distribution of the credit. These results highlight the importance of judicial efficiency 
for small firms in the determination of their capital structures.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In making their lending decisions, rational creditors will attempt to ascertain not 
just the quality of the borrower, but also the legal protection available to them should the 
borrower default. When the enforcement of lenders’ rights is poor or costly in terms of 
administrative costs and time consumed in legal proceedings, lenders try to protect 
themselves through alternative mechanisms. For example, lenders might ask for the 
security of fixed assets, require personal guarantees, choose borrowers with presumably 
lower default risk such as wealthy individuals or large sized firms, and prefer to extend 
only short-term loans. A specific claim on fixed assets reduces chances of greater loss in 
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case of default of the borrower. Short-term debt makes it easier for lenders to monitor 
their borrowers and reduce their misbehaviour by threatening not to renew the loan 
[Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999)]. Under an inefficient judicial system, 
borrowers without a personal guarantee or collateral of fixed assets may be denied 
financing. This could result in less lending in the economy. Similarly, the financial 
structure of many firms could tilt toward short-term financing as lenders would prefer to 
extend loans only of short maturity.  
Recent advancement in the literature of law and finance has highlighted the 
importance of institutional development and creditor rights protection for the 
development of capital markets. Various research studies have focused on cross-country 
differences in the quality of law, regulations, protection available to creditors, minority 
shareholders and the effects of all these on the development of financial system, 
corporate governance, and financing patterns [Shleifer and Vishny (1997); La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996, 1997, 1998, 2000); Dehesa, Druck, and 
Plekhanov (2007); Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007)]. Despite these developments 
in the area of law and finance, within-country judicial efficiency and its impact on the 
decisions of leverage and debt-maturity structure used by listed firms have attracted much 
less attention as observed by Sherwood, Shepherd and De Souza (1994: p.4) 
―Self-evident though it may seem, the proposition that a strong judicial process 
enhances economic performance is far from proven‖.  
Moreover, the literature does not isolate the effect of legal and judicial efficiency 
on the pattern of financing. Empirical literature must still enrich itself with regard to 
identifying the specific impact of judicial efficiency on lenders willingness to increase the 
flow of credit to firms. A few known studies that provide evidence on within-country 
judicial efficiency and corporate financial decisions include Magri (2006), Jappelli, 
Pagano and Bianco (2005) and Pinheiro and Cabral (1999). These studies relate judicial 
efficiency to the overall level of credit in an economy. But no study exists that measures 
the impact of within-country judicial efficiency on capital structure of listed firms. The 
scanty empirical evidence warrants further investigation into the relationship of judicial 
efficiency and financing decisions. The objective of this paper is to go a step forward in 
this direction to fill the empirical gap by providing evidence on impact of the efficiency 
of district high courts on the capital structure of listed firms in Pakistan.  
The presence of large number of firms with negative equity and few cases of 
forced bankruptcies in Pakistan motivates us to investigate the impact of judicial 
efficiency on leverage. If a firm has negative equity, the firm is considered to be 
technically bankrupt. The presence of a large number of firms with negative 
shareholders’ equities in Pakistan naturally provokes the question as ―why do creditors of 
the bankrupted firms shy away from going to court against such firms?‖ It is likely that 
the judicial efficiency is low in Pakistan in terms of time and cost, which makes the 
recovery of loans uneconomical for creditors. In fact, Claessens, Djankov and Klapper 
(2003) provide empirical support to this argument from 1472 listed firms in five East 
Asian countries. They report that efficiency of a judicial system serves as a critical in 
determining the creditors’ choice to recover their funds through judicial systems or 
through other mechanisms.  
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Given that resource endowments and demand for judicial services vary across 
different districts, it is reasonable to expect that judicial efficiency will vary across 
different districts. Therefore, Pakistan is a good candidate to study the impact of within-
country judicial efficiency on capital structure decisions of firms. Therefore, this study 
exploits variations in judicial efficiency across different districts of Pakistan and relates 
these variations to corporate leverage. Additionally, this paper also explores the 
possibility that worsening judicial efficiency has differential impact on leverage ratio of 
small and large firms. Small firms are more susceptible to information asymmetry 
problems and external macroeconomic shocks. These two features make small firms 
more sensitive to variations in judicial efficiency. Hence, it is expected that deterioration 
in judicial efficiency will have greater negative impact on leverage ratios of small firms 
compared to that of the large firms.   
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the law and 
finance literature to draw testable hypotheses. Section 3 discusses data, the model 
specifications, and variables. Section 4 reports and discusses results of regression 
analysis, while Section 5 presents the conclusion and policy implications. 
 
2.  RELATED LITERATURE 
 
2.1.  Judicial Efficiency and Leverage 
Legal protection to creditors and enforcement of the same by judicial system play 
a major role in credit contracts. Legal protection alone may not be sufficient to prevent 
parties to the credit contract from engaging in opportunistic behaviour. As remarked by 
Galindo (2001, p.16). 
―…If institutions are inadequate it is likely that the benefits that the other parties 
have to gain from reneging on the debt contract can be pronounced enough to 
prevent the contract’s realisation. Hence, the ability of these institutions to align 
the players’ incentives with the clauses of the debt contract can become an engine 
of promotion of financial breadth…‖ 
Efficient judicial system reduces the chances of opportunistic behaviour of 
borrowers. In an inefficient judicial system borrowers would face lower costs of default. 
When borrowers know that they can gain more by defaulting on the loan, they will 
choose to default even if they are solvent [Eaton and Gersovitz (1981); Jappelli, Pagano, 
and Bianco (2005)]. In situation like this where borrowers have lower incentives to repay 
the loan, lenders will be very cautious and selective in making loans. As a result, the 
equilibrium amount of credit available in the credit market will be smaller.  Bae and 
Goyal (2009) argue that an inefficient judicial system increases uncertainty about the 
repayment of loan by the borrower. As the credit risk increases, lenders will charge 
higher interest rates. And in some cases lenders will ration borrowers instead of charging 
higher interest rates [Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)]. In either case, volume of lending is 
expected to decline. 
Empirically, several studies have found a positive relationship between creditors’ 
rights protection and lending volume, such as Gropp, et al. (1997), Freixas (1991), and 
Fabbri and Padula (2004).  Gropp, et al. (1997) used U.S. cross-state data to determine 
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the impact of personal bankruptcy laws in various U.S. states on lending to low-assets 
households; they found a positive relationship between creditor rights protection and 
lending volume. Freixas (1991) confirmed that in Europe both the cost and the duration 
of the judicial process to repossess collateral were negatively related to the size of 
lending to firms and house acquisitions.  
Fabbri and Padula (2004) examined the relationship between judicial efficiency 
and the distribution of credit to households. They used data on Italian households and the 
performance of judicial districts the proxy for which was the backlog of trials pending in 
a given district. They found both statistically and economically significant findings that 
districts where judiciary is inefficient, credit availability to poor households declines but 
to wealthy households increases. The authors hint that this phenomenon might be due to 
the fact that poor legal system redistributes credit towards borrowers with more assets. 
Several studies have used cross-country data to establish the relationship between 
law and finance. In two seminal papers, La Porta, et al. (1997, 1998) empirically 
analysed a large cross-section of data from forty-nine countries to show how the origin of 
the legal system, the protection available to investors and the efficiency of judicial system 
influence the development of credit markets and lending volumes. One important finding 
of their studies is that countries with more efficient judicial systems have wider capital 
markets and enjoy higher lending volumes. 
Laevena and Giovann (2003) studied the effect of judicial efficiency on banks' 
lending spreads for a large cross section of countries. They used two different set of data 
to measure bank interest rate spreads. In one data set, they measured the interest rate 
spread in 106 countries at an aggregate level, and in another set they did the same for 32 
countries at the level of individual banks. After controlling for a number of other country-
specific features, the authors found that judicial efficiency, in addition to inflation, is the 
main driver of interest rate spreads across countries. The implication of their findings is 
that in addition to making the overall macroeconomic conditions better in a country, 
judicial reforms are vital to lowering the cost of finance for households and firms. 
Resultantly, a lower cost of credit will lead to an increased level of borrowing. Similarly 
on the relationship between interest rates and judicial efficiency, Meador (1982) and 
Jaffee (1985) found evidence that interest rates charged on mortgage were higher in U.S. 
states where the judicial process to repossess the collateral was lengthy and costly. 
Following the above line of arguments and keeping everything else constant, it is 
expected that leverage ratios of firms will be higher in districts where courts are more 
efficient.  
 
2.2.  Judicial Efficiency and Firm Attributes 
Ex-ante, lenders lend only to borrowers that have the ability to pay back the loan 
amount and the rate of interest on it. If complete information about the borrower and his 
investment project is available, lenders can easily distinguish between borrowers that 
have good credit risk and those that have bad credit risk. In such a case, the problem of an 
inefficient judicial system may not be severe since lenders themselves can reduce the 
chances of default by denying credit to borrowers with bad credit risk. However, the 
problem of asymmetric information does exist in the real world and is exacerbated by 
judicial inefficiency. When judicial efficiency worsens, lenders react more to asymmetric 
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information problems as the cost of choosing an undesirable borrower increases with the 
inefficiency of the judicial system. Consequently, lenders would not lend to opaque and 
risky borrowers or borrowers with low-quality projects under an inefficient judicial 
system.  
The literature suggests that certain firm attributes convey information about a firm 
and the quality of the projects that the firm undertakes. Size of the firm, returns volatility 
and collateral offered against a loan are such attributes that can serve as proxies for 
information availability about the firm, the firm riskiness and the quality of its investment 
projects. The former suggests information availability about the firm and the latter two 
convey information about the riskiness of the firm and the quality of its investment projects. 
The following firm attributes have widely been used in capital structure research. 
These features not only have direct impact on a firm’s capital structure, but also their 
interaction with judicial efficiency can have additional effect on the firm’s capital 
structure. 
 
2.2.1.  Firm Size 
The information asymmetry problem is severe with small firms, as they find it 
costly to produce and distribute information about themselves [Pettit and Singer (1985)]. 
This is why small firms are considered more opaque than large firms. The inadequate 
supply of information creates problem for lenders to distinguish between high quality and 
low quality borrowers. This increases the risk of adverse selection. Under poor 
enforcement of lenders’ right by judiciary, lenders will not be able to recover the full 
amount of their loan from low-quality borrowers. Consequently, borrowers could shy 
away from lending to small firms. 
Moreover, a firm’s size can be a proxy for the riskiness of the firm. Large firms 
are considered to be more diversified and have greater capacity for absorbing negative 
external shocks due to their significant resource base as compared to small firms [Titman 
and Wessels (1988)]. The most commonly used term to refer to this phenomenon is ―too 
big to fail‖ which suggests that large firms have a lower probability of falling into 
financial distress and bankruptcy, the opposite of which is true for small firms. Since 
poor judicial enforcement makes it difficult for lenders to recover their loan from firms in 
financial distress, lenders would either impose higher costs on lending to small firms or 
in some cases simply refuse credit to small firms. 
Both of the above arguments about firm size imply that judicial efficiency will matter 
more for small firms. As the judicial efficiency worsens, credit flow to small firms declines. 
 
2.2.2.  Collateral 
Collateral can solve several problems associated with information asymmetries. 
Coco (2000) discusses that collateral can solve various problems engendered by 
asymmetric information in credit contracts, such as issues related to project valuation, 
uncertainty about quality of the project, riskiness of the borrower, and moral hazards.  
Chan and Kanatas (1985) argue that collateral can help lenders and borrowers who 
disagree about the value of the project due to information asymmetry. As collateral has a more 
stable value than a project whose cash flows will accrue in the future, lenders feel more 
confident lending against collateral than they would lending against an uncertain project. 
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Collateral can also solve problems related to riskiness of the project or the 
borrower. Opportunistic borrowers will not like to pledge valuable assets as collateral 
against loans, especially borrowers with risky projects. Studies like Bester (1985), 
Besanko and Thakor (1987), and Chan and Thakor (1987) show that the value of the 
collateral and average riskiness of the projects are inversely related; hence, valuable 
collateral suggests low project risk. By resolving this information asymmetry problem, 
collateral increases the efficiency of the credit market. Following a similar line of 
argument, Bester (1985, 1987) argues that collateral reveals information about different 
borrowers and counteracts adverse selection problems. Also, when borrowers know that 
their misbehaviour can result in loss of the valuable collateral, they will preferably not 
engage in moral hazard activities [Barro (1976)]. 
In all of the above arguments, collateral either eliminates or at least mitigates 
problems related to information asymmetries, hence it can be expected that judicial 
inefficiency would not affect all borrowers alike. Borrowers with valuable collaterals 
would not face severe information asymmetry problems, and would less be affected as 
judicial efficiency worsens. 
Contrary to the above prediction about collateral, judicial efficiency and leverage, 
as discussed in Galindo (2001), collateral may lose its significance if lenders feel that 
they cannot recover it through judicial process. However, Magri (2006) argues that in 
case of bankruptcy of the borrowers, lenders will face smaller losses if the borrowers 
have more tangible assets because these assets can serve as collateral. Since growth 
options become worthless when the borrower faces bankruptcy and only the value of 
tangible assets can be realised in the market, creditors will prefer to lend to borrowers 
with more tangible assets. It will be interesting to know which of the above competing 
arguments stand up in the empirical investigation of judicial efficiency and leverage used 
by listed firms in Pakistan. 
Mixed empirical evidence exists on the relationship of tangible assets and leverage 
when the former is interacted with a proxy for efficiency of legal system or its judiciary. 
Fan, Titman, and Twite (2008) use two proxies for tangibility of assets and interact them 
with an index of corruption which measures how inefficient a legal system of given 
country is in protecting investors’ rights. Their first proxy for tangibility, measured by 
market-to-book ratio, has significant influence on capital structure of firms in more 
corrupt countries and weaker legal systems. However, their second proxy, measured by 
total tangible assets to total assets, is not statistically significant. 
An indication of the fact that inefficient judicial system will redistribute credit 
towards borrowers with more assets is found in the empirical results of Fabbri and Padula 
(2004). They found that districts where judiciary is inefficient, credit availability to poor 
households declines but to wealthy households increases. Their results purport that it 
might be due to the fact that poor legal system redistributes credit towards borrowers with 
more assets.  
 
2.2.3.  Earnings Volatility 
Earnings volatility emanates from business risk in the operations of a firm or from 
poor management practices. In either case earnings volatility is proxy for the probability 
of financial distress. All else constant, Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) argue that firms 
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with more volatile cash flows should have lower leverage. Combined with an inefficient 
judicial system, earning volatility should decrease the amount of leverage further.  
 
2.2.4.  Profitability 
Myers (1984) argues that firms prefer internally generated funds to external funds 
and debt finance to equity finance. He calls this preference of firms as pecking order. 
This is because of asymmetric information; the cost of external funds is higher than 
internal funds and the cost of raising equity is higher than the cost of debt. Profitable 
firms are, thus, expected to have lower percentage of debt-financing. A negative relation 
is also expected between profitability and leverage from the view of double taxation. 
Auerbach (1979) says that firms have incentives to retain earnings to avoid dividend 
taxes. Since information asymmetry is more of an issue where judicial efficiency is poor 
[Magri (2006)], it is expected that firms will find it difficult to raise external finance and 
will distribute less profit where courts are inefficient. Empirically, two studies have found 
evidence to support the above arguments. The first study by Fan, et al. (2008) uses both 
aggregate and firm level data from 39 countries to examine the influence of institutions 
on leverage and leverage. Fan, et al. (2008) use corruption index as a proxy for efficiency 
of justice and find that in legal systems that protect investors more, profitability has less 
of an influence on leverage. The second study by La Porta, et al. (2000) reports that the 
firms in civil law countries, where legal protection to investors is higher, pay higher 
percentage of dividends.  
 
2.2.5.  Growth 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that agency costs of debt are higher for growing 
firms as mangers in these firms have the incentive to invest sub-optimally and 
expropriate wealth from bondholders to shareholders. As growing firms have more 
options to invest in risky projects, lenders fear that such firms may create moral hazards 
for them. As a result, lenders will either hesitate to lend to growing firms or charge higher 
interest on lending to growing firms. Titman and Wessels (1988) also predict inverse 
relationship between growth opportunities and leverage, but from different angle. They 
note that since growth opportunities cannot be offered as collateral and do not generate 
current income, firms that have more capital assets in form of growth opportunities are 
expected to have lower leverage ratio. Myers (1977) developed a model of determinants 
of capital structure wherein he treated growth opportunities as call options. Myers (1977) 
suggests that growth opportunities are discretionary; hence they should not be financed 
with costly leverage. On the other hand, fixed assets are sunk costs and they can best be 
financed with leverage.  
In support of the above arguments, several empirical studies found a negative 
relationship between growth opportunities and firms’ leverage ratios. These studies 
include Titman and Wessels (1988), Barclay and Smith (1995) and Rajan and Zingales 
(1995). 
The future growth opportunities under the framework of Myers (1977) and Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) can best be proxied by the ratio of market-to-book value of a firm. 
However, there is an alternative proxy which tracks the annual percentage increase in 
total assets. The latter is a more stable measure in case of Pakistan because the Karachi 
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Stock Exchange experienced abnormal growth from 2002 and onwards. This overall 
increase in market values of firms was not necessarily a reflection of their growth 
opportunities. Since growth opportunities have lower values as collateral against loans 
and that they are regarded as proxy for agency costs, it is expected that leverage ratios of 
growing firms will be lower. 
 
2.2.6.  Non-Debt Tax Shields (NDTS) 
DeAngelo and Mausulis (1980) showed in a theoretical model that depreciation 
expense, depletion allowance, and investment tax credits serve as substitutes to debt tax 
shields and lower the firm’s optimal debt level. If their model holds, then the observed 
differences in the debt ratios of different industries can be attributed to some extent to the 
level of NDTS that each industry bears. To test this hypothesis, Bowen, et al. (1982) used 
cross-sectional industries data and found that the existence of NDTS significantly 
lowered the debt ratios at industry level. However, Boquist and Moore (1984) did not 
find any evidence that supported the NDTS hypothesis. To test the hypothesis they used 
firm-level data and used a measure of leverage that included only long-term liabilities. 
The reason for getting different results against the previous studies was due to the use of 
a different proxy for leverage and the use firm-level data instead of industry-level data.  
 
2.3.  Testable Hypotheses  
H1 Firms will have lower leverage ratios in districts where judicial efficiency is 
low 
H2 Judicial inefficiency reduces the leverage ratios of small firms more than  
leverage ratios large firms 
H3 In districts where judicial efficiency is low, firms with little collaterals have 
lower leverage ratios than firms with more collateral 
H4 Growing firms have lower leverage ratios in districts where judicial 
efficiency is low than non-growing firms 
H5 In efficient judicial districts, firms leverage ratio will be more sensitive to 
coefficient of income volatility.  
H6 In the presence of judicial inefficiency, more profitable firms will have 
lower leverage ratios than less profitable firms 
H7 Leverage ratio increases with the size of the firm 
H8 Firms with more collaterals have higher leverage ratios 
H9 Leverage ratio decreases with the profitability of the firm 
H10 Growth opportunities decreases leverage ratio 
H11 Volatility of a firm’s cash flows will negatively affect leverage ratio of the 
firm.  
 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Data Sources and Sample 
The four provincial high courts (Peshawar, Lahore, Sindh, and Baluchistan) 
restarted publication of their annual reports in the year 2001 after many years. Therefore, 
we have chosen the year 2001 as a starting point of our data collection of the judicial 
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statistics. For selection of judicial districts, we used the criteria of the location of head 
office of the listed firms. We found that listed firms are head-quartered in a total of 27 
districts out of the total of 104 judicial districts. It is expected that efficiency of a judicial 
district does not change in short period of time. Therefore, we calculated a time series 
average for each district. 
We obtained the firms’ financial data from ―Balance Sheet Analysis of Stock 
Exchange Listed Firms‖ a publication of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). The sample is 
collected  from years 2000 to 2006. We started with the inclusion of all non-financial 
firms in the analysis. However, we removed outlier observations that were below 1 
percentile or above 99 percentile. We also excluded firms with negative equity figures as 
these firms do not show normal behaviour. Finally, we were left with an unbalanced 
panel of 370 firms.  
 
3.2.  Measurement of Variables 
 
3.2.1.  The Measure of Leverage 
The basic notion of leverage implies long-term debt. Short-term debt is often 
provided to firms by their suppliers for convenience, not as a source of financing. The 
commonly used term for such type of debt is spontaneous financing that does not involve 
active decision making of the financial manager with regard to the firm’s optimal debt-
equity ratio. Earlier studies like Ferri and Jones (1979), Marsh (1982), Castanias (1983), 
Bradley, et al. (1984) and Kim and Sorensen (1986) used only long-term debt as a proxy 
for leverage with the exception of Titman and Wessels (1988) who also included short-
term debt as a proxy for leverage. 
However, most of the studies on comparisons and determinants of capital structure 
using cross-countries data employed a proxy for leverage that included both short-term 
and long-term debt e.g. [Rajan and Zingales (1995); Booth, Aivazian, and Demirguc-
Kunt (2001); and Fan, et al. (2008)].  One reason why these studies included short-term 
debt in leverage ratio might be, as found by Booth, et al. (2001), that firms in developing 
economies mostly rely on bank financing which is usually short-term in nature. Given 
that, all of the short-term debt cannot be regarded as spontaneous financing especially in 
developing economies. Since Pakistan is a developing economy where banks remain the 
major financiers of the corporate sector, short-term financing cannot be ignored in the 
capital structure research. The measures of leverage used in this study are motivated by 
these considerations. The first proxy for leverage (LEV1) is the ratio of long-term debt to 
total assets whereas the second proxy (LEV2) is the ratio of long-term debt plus short-
term debt to total assets. A third measured used in many empirical studies is a measure of 
leverage based on the market value instead of book value of equity. The study cannot use 
this measure due to the bias in the market values of equity in the sample period. The 
Karachi Stock Exchange experienced several-folds rise from the year 2002 and onwards. 
If the study uses market-based measure of leverage instead of a measure based on the 
book values, the persistent yearly increase in share prices would show inflated values of 
equity which in turn would lower the ratio of debt-to-equity each year, which would 
increase the chances of heteroscedasticity. On the other hand, measures of leverage based 
on book values are free from such abrupt fluctuations.  
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3.2.2.  The Measure of Judicial Efficiency 
Extant literature suggests different types of proxies to measure judicial efficiency. 
In majority of the international studies, [see, Modigliani and Perotti (1997); Giannetti 
(2003); Kumar, et al. (1999); Giannetti (2001)], a subjective index of judicial efficiency 
is used. Such an index was either developed by the researchers themselves or was 
borrowed from other organisations such as the Business International Corporations 
(BIC). Other studies have used more objective measures of judicial efficiency. For 
example, Fabbri (2002) and Fabbri, and Padula (2004) have used the fraction of pending 
cases to total settled cases or the fraction of pending cases to case started during a year. 
Shah and Shah (2016) have used three different measures of judicial efficiency which are 
(a) inverse of time in days that a judicial court takes in resolving a case (b) number of 
procedures involved in registering a case till the final decision implemented by a court, 
and (c) costs incurred on a judicial case as a percentage of the recovery amount. Due to 
data availability issues, we use the proxy of judicial efficiency where pending cases are 
scaled by some base figure such as judicial cases decided in a year, total cases started in a 
year, or population of a district. Therefore, we use the following measures of judicial 
efficiency: 
 
year that during initiated  cases of Number
year the of end the at district given a in pending cases of Number
JE1   
Other possible proxies for judicial efficiency may include: 
year that during off-disposed cases of Number
year a of end the at district given a in pending cases of Number
JE2 
 
thousands in measured district the of Population
year the of end the at district given a in pending cases of Number
JE3 
 
thousands in measured district the of Population
present) are courts  such(where court banking in pending cases of Number
JE4 
 
Higher value of JE shows inefficiency of a judicial court because larger number of 
pending cases as percentage of disposed-off cases shows that the court takes a longer 
time in deciding cases or is not capable of meeting the demand faced by it in comparison 
to other courts.  
For simplicity, the JE1 is simply represented by JE in the rest of the paper. JE1 is 
found to be highly correlated with JE2, JE3, and JE4. This implies that all these measures 
of judicial efficiency are good alternatives. We use JE1 as a primary proxy for judicial 
efficiency throughout this paper.  
 
3.2.3.  Measurement of the Intendent Variables  
We include all important determinants of the corporate leverage as control 
variables. These variables include size, collateral, profitability, net income volatility, 
growth, dividends, and non-debt tax shield benefits. Names, symbols, and measures of 
these variables are reported in Table 1A.  
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Table 1A 
Names and Measurement of the Variables 
Name of Variable Denoted by Measured by 
Leverage LEV1 Long-term debt to total assets 
Leverage 2 LEV2  Total debts to total assets 
SIZE SZ log of assets 
Tangibility TG Net fixed assets divided by assets 
Growth1 GROWTH Average percentage change  in assets 
Growth2 MVBV Market-to-book ratio 
Volatility VOL Coefficient of variation of profitability 
Profitability PROF Net income / total assets 
Dividends DIV Amount of dividends / net income 
NDTS NDTS Depreciation for the year / total assets 
 
3.3.  Model Specification 
We use a panel data framework to study the relationship between corporate leverage 
and judicial efficiency. The basic form of a panel regression is given in Equation (1).  
itiitit zxy 
'  … … … … … … (1) 
Where yit is the leverage ratio of firm i at time t. x
’
it is the vector of the independent 
variables. αz’i represent idiosyncratic effects and z
’
i represent a constant term that absorbs 
all observable and unobservable heterogeneity. If z
’
i does not vary across panel units, then 
OLS will yield consistent estimates. However, firms might vary from one another due to 
industry differences or managers aptitude towards risk. Therefore, it is rather a strict 
assumption that systematic difference across firms do not exist. Panel data models 
provide a wide array of options to deal with unobserved heterogeneity. The most 
common of these models is the fixed effects model, which is given below. 
itiitit axy   … … … … … … …  (2) 
The term αi in Equation (2) is equal αz
’
i in Equation (1). This term absorbs firm-
specific effects that do not vary across time for a given firm. One common disadvantage 
of fixed-effects models is that we lose many degrees of freedom in defining dummy 
variables for each firm. On other hand, another commonly used model is the random 
effects model. This model yield efficient estimates when the firm-specific effects have 
low or no correlation with the independent variables. Random effects model can be 
written in the following form [Greene (2006)]. 
itiiiitit azEazazxy  ]}[{][
'''
 … … … … (3) 
A simplified version of the above equation is given below. 
itiitit uaxy 
'
 … … … … … … (4) 
Equation (4) treats the term ui to be random element for each specific panel unit.  
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The question of selecting a better model that fits the data is both empirical and 
theoretical. Hausman (1978) proposed a test that identifies systematic differences in the 
estimates of fixed and random effects. If systematic differences exist, then the use of 
fixed effects model is preferred. 
Using panel data framework, we estimate two types of regression equations. First, 
we assume that judicial efficiency uniformly influences firms in their capital structure 
decision. We call it a restricted model. Second, we assume that firm-specific factors 
moderate the impact of judicial efficiency on firm capital structure decisions. We call this 
model as a less-restricted model. For the less-restricted model, we estimate differential 
panel data models by including interaction terms between JE and the independent 
variables. To avoid the problem of simultaneity, all explanatory variables are lagged one 
period back excluding volatility and GROWTH.  
 
3.3.1.  Baseline Estimation 
As mentioned previously, we estimated a restricted and less-restricted model. 
Assuming that judicial efficiency has an equal influence on all types of firms, the 
following restricted model is estimated.  
 
ititititiit VOLMVBVPROFTGSZaY 51,41,31,21,1  
  
tiiiititi
INDYRSJEDVDNDTS   2715181,71,6
 … (5) 
Where Yit is the leverage ratio for firm i at time t and SZ, TG, PROF, MVBV, NTDS, and 
DVD, are lagged independent variables whereas. JE measures efficiency of a judicial 
district.  YRS represent year dummies. Industry dummies are represent by the variable 
IND. A total of 28 industries are included in the sample. Wald-joint significance test is 
used for testing the joint significance of the dummy variables.  
 
3.2.2.  Differential Impact of Judicial Efficiency 
Assuming that firm-specific factors might moderate the impact of judicial 
efficiency on leverage, we introduce interaction terms between the measures of judicial 
efficiency and dummy variables that are based on the quartiles of selected explanatory 
variables. We define three dummy variables and one base category for the selected 
explanatory variables. For example, to interact judicial efficiency with firm size, we 
define four dummies for firm size as follows: 




otherwise 0
quartile 1st the in is value  SZif 1
S1  




otherwise 0
quartile 2nd the in is value  SZif 1
S2
 




otherwise 0
quartile 4th the in is value  SZif 1
S4  
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If we include all interaction terms between judicial efficiency and the dummies, it 
might create the problem of high multicollinearity.  To avoid it, we estimate separate 
regressions that include interaction terms between dummies of a single explanatory 
variable and the JE. All specifications include full set of dummy variables for years and 
industries. Since we are interested in investigating the impact of judicial efficiency on the 
leverage decision of small and large firms, it will be better that the referent category is 
one of the middle quartiles dummy variables against which the interactive effects of the 
1
st
 and the 4
th
 quartiles can be compared. This is why the 3
rd
 quartile is selected to be 
referent category in all regression models.          
 
4.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1B reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. 
The mean values of LEV1 and LEV2 are 0.1297 and 0.5686 across all firms and time 
periods. The mean value of LEV1, which represents long-term debt to book value of 
total assets, is not a complete departure from what was found in other empirical 
studies. Rajan and Zingales (1995) report mean LEV1 of .0980 for Germany, 0.1210 
for Italy, 0.1240 for U.K., 0.1570 for France, 0.1890 for Japan, 0.2330 for U.S.A., 
and 0.2810 for Canada (see Table II of Rajan and Zingales). The mean value of total 
debt to book value of assets ratio (LEV2) seems to be lower by about 5-10 percentage 
points as compared to what Rajan and Zingales (1995) found for a sample of firms in 
G7 countries. However, Booth, et al. (2001), who studied the capital structure 
choices in 10 developing countries, report much higher ratios for both LEV1 (0.260) 
and LEV2 (0.656) for a sample of 96 Pakistani listed firms. One possible explanation 
for this might be that their sample contained only 96 firms that were included in the 
Karachi Stock Exchange 100 Index. Firms included in KSE-100 Index are the largest 
firms either in their respective sectors or in the whole lot of listed firms. This is why 
the sample of firms included in the study of Booth, et al. (2001) was predominantly 
large firms. It is thus expected that those firms had higher leverage ratios just like the 
information asymmetry and trade-off theories suggest. On the other hand, the sample 
used in this study is larger and includes firms of all sizes. 
The descriptive statistics for several other variables warrant attention. For 
example, the maximum value for tangibility (TANG) is 0.9876 which means that the 
firm has only 1.24 percent current assets. It seems quite odd. This value is for 
Pakistan Cement Ltd. which was previously known as Chakwal Cement Company 
Ltd. It is important to mention that the firm had no production during the period 
under review. Hence, current assets were negligible. To remove all such outliers, all 
corresponding rows where TANG was above 0.95 were dropped. This exercise 
resulted in eliminating 18 observations. However, this dropout had no significant 
impact on the results. 
The variable PROF (profitability) has a minimum of −0.758 and a maximum of 
0.864. After a pooled OLS regression with LEV1 and LEV2 as dependent variables and 
PROF explanatory variable, residuals plot against PROF showed that there were only 3 
values of PROF which were less than –0.5 and were outlier in the plot and 3 values 
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greater than 0.70 which were also outliers.  After removing these values, the new mean 
value for PROF did not change. However, the minimum and maximum values were        
–0.4865 and 0.5678 respectively.  Similar procedure was repeated for other variables to 
remove outliers and influential observations from the data set. This exercise resulted in 
losing 126 observations. All regressions were estimated after all outliers were purged out.   
 
Table 1B 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variables Median Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
LEV1 0.097 0.1297 0.1459 0 0.845 
LEV2 0.596 0.5686 0.2062 0.0029 0.9489 
SZ 6.874 6.9734 1.4832 2.3609 11.9228 
PROF 0.0312 0.0419 0.1058 –1.1463 0.7701 
TANG 0.503 0.499 0.2227 0.0024 0.9876 
VOL 0.705 1.1893 1.1637 0.0225 4.9265 
GROWTH 0.13 0.1538 0.1517 –0.2673 1.3545 
NDTS 0.046 0.0509 0.0451 0 0.7256 
MVBV 0.74 1.3067 1.7167 0.0009 11.5 
DIV 0.00 0.2527 0.3576 0 2.4474 
 
Table 1B reports descriptive statistics of variables using panel data capabilities for 
a sample of 370 firms listed on KSE. LEV1 is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets 
whereas LEV2 is the ratio of total debt to total assets.  SZ is the natural logarithm of total 
assets. PROF is the ratio of net income to total assets. TANG is the value of net fixed 
assets over total assets. VOL is the coefficient of variation of PROF.  GROWTH is the 
average of annual percentage change in total assets. MVBV is the ratio of market value 
per share to book value per share. NDTS represents non-debt tax shields and is measured 
as the ratio of depreciation for the year over total assets. 
In Table 1C, the matrix of correlations among the variables used in the 
regressions indicates that there is no serious issue of multicollinearity among the 
explanatory variables. LEV1and LEV2 are negatively correlated with PROF, 
GROWTH, NDTS and DIV whereas they are positively correlated with SZ, TANG, 
and VOL. These relationships are in line with the expectations, except the proxy for 
volatility of net income i.e. VOL which according to trade-off theory should be 
negatively associated with leverage. It is not possible to isolate unobserved fixed 
effects in simple correlation; the study will be able to check the robustness and the 
significance of this positive relationship between VOL and leverage under various 
specifications of regression models in the next section. Relationships between 
explanatory variables show that large firms have more tangible assets, are more 
profitable, comparatively grow more than small firms, have higher market-to-book 
ratios, pay more dividends and have less volatile net incomes.  
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Table 1C 
Matrix of Correlation among the Variables 
 LEV1 LEV2 SZ TANG PROF MVBV GROWTH VOL NDTS DIV 
LEV1 1          
LEV2 0.521 1         
SZ 0.1923 0.1373 1        
TANG 0.5157 0.1908 0.0614 1       
PROF -0.255 -0.3656 0.2109 -0.2751 1      
MVBV -0.0807 0.0001 0.1791 -0.1614 0.3057 1     
GROWTH -0.0113 0.0271 0.1941 -0.0336 0.274 0.1132 1    
VOL 0.0687 0.0356 -0.2714 0.1763 -0.342 -0.1138 -0.3173 1   
NDTS -0.1911 -0.057 0.1333 -0.2613 0.2265 0.2237 0.2377 -0.1381 1  
DIV -0.2273 -0.2343 0.1483 -0.2626 0.2892 0.1765 0.059 -0.2303 0.1812 1 
 
4.1.2. Descriptive Statistics of the Judicial Efficiency 
Table 1D provides descriptive statistics for alternative measures of judicial 
efficiency while Table 1E reports the matrix of correlation among these measures. 
Judicial efficiency in different districts as measured by the ratio of pending cases at the 
end of the year to cases instituted during the year (JE1) had a mean value of 0.794 and 
standard deviation of 0.326. The minimum value of this measure was 0.29 (for the 
Lasbella district) while the maximum value was 1.309 (for the Gujranwala district). The 
second measure of judicial efficiency—the ratio of pending cases at the end of the year to 
cases disposed of during the year (JE2)—demonstrate similar statistics, with a minimum 
value of 0.28 and a maximum of 1.43 for the same districts (i.e., Lasbella and 
Gujranwala, respectively). These statistics suggest that, as Lasbella is a less developed 
district in Baluchistan and has a smaller population, has a much smaller demand for 
judicial resources in comparison to other developed cities; moreover, when judicial 
efficiency is measured as a ratio of pending cases per thousand persons (JE3), Lasbella 
still has the lowest ratio.   
While JE4 is similar to JE2, the only difference is that it replaces the high courts’ 
statistics data with Special Banking Courts data in districts where such courts are 
operational. 
The standard deviations of all the proxies of judicial efficiency show that there are 
reasonable variations in the efficiency of justice across the sample districts. The matrix of 
correlation between JE1, JE2 and JE4 in Table 1E shows that these measures are well 
correlated. Such a higher correlation indicates that it will matter less to replace one 
measure with others. Similarly, such a property also satisfies the conditions for 
instrumental variables i.e. one variable can be instrumented with the others. 
 
Table 1D 
Descriptive Statistics of the Alternative Measures of Judicial Efficiency 
Variable Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
JE1 0.673 0.794 0.326 0.291 1.309 
JE2 0.727 0.835 0.341 0.287 1.438 
JE3 .019 0.023 0.021 0.003 0.05 
JE4 0.813 1.004 0.645 0.159 2.755 
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Table 1E 
Matrix of Correlation among the Measures of Judicial Efficiency 
  JE1 JE2 JE3 JE4 
JE1 1    
JE2 0.969 1   
JE3 0.416 0.352 1  
JE4 0.457 0.492 0.112 1 
 
Table 1D and Table 1E, show descriptive statistics, and matrix of correlation 
of alternative measures of the judicial efficiency. These statistics are based on time 
series averages of 3 years judicial data of 27 districts. JE1 is the ratio of all pending 
cases to cases instituted during a year. JE2 is the ratio of pending cases to disposed-
off cases during a year. JE3 is the ratio of pending cases at the end of a year in a 
judicial district high court normalised by the district population which is measured in 
thousands. While JE4 is similar to JE2, the only difference is that it replaces the high 
courts’ statistics data with Special Banking Courts data in districts where such courts 
are operational. 
 
4.2.  Results of the Main Effects Model 
Results of baseline regression model are reported in Table 2. This model tests the 
hypothesis that worsening judicial efficiency affects leverage ratios of all firms alike. The 
table reports regression results of both fixed effects model and random effects. The first 
column of Table 2 shows names of the explanatory variables. The 2nd and the 3rd 
columns reports coefficients of the explanatory variables from fixed and random effects 
models where the dependent variable is LEV1. Similarly, the fourth and the fifth columns 
show coefficients of the explanatory variables from fixed effects and random effects 
models where the dependent variable is LEV2. Standard errors (robust) are reported 
inside the parentheses. In both LEV1 and LEV2 regressions, the Hausman test rejects the 
null hypothesis of no systematic differences in the estimators of fixed and random effects. 
To know the relative significance of each variable, the study ran another set of 
regressions on standardised values of the explained and explanatory variables and 
calculated beta coefficients of the explanatory variables. Theses beta coefficients from 
fixed-effects models are reported in Table 3. 
Consistent with the information asymmetry and the trade-off theories, the firm size 
is positively correlated with leverage in all specifications. The coefficients of the variable 
SZi,t–1 are significant at the 1 percent level in all regressions, irrespective of whether 
leverage is measured as a ratio of long-term debt-to-total-assets (LEV1) or total debt to 
total assets (LEV2). In addition to its statistical significance, the size of a firm also has the 
largest economic significance. As shown in Table 3 (column LEV1), the beta coefficient 
estimated by the fixed effects model indicates that one standard deviation increase in  
SZi,t–1 will increase LEV1 by approximately 0.796 standard deviations. In the second 
regression in which the dependent variable is LEV2, the size of a firm still has the largest 
economic significance i.e., one standard deviation increase in SZi,t–1 increases LEV2 by 
0.516 standard deviations. 
 Importance of Judicial Efficiency in Capital Structure Decisions of Small Firms  377 
The coefficient for TGi,t-1 is positive and statistically significant in three 
regressions. However, it is insignificant in the fixed-effects model in which the dependent 
variable is LEV2. The results suggest that the tangibility of assets matters only in the case 
of long-term financing. Since LEV2 is a ratio of total-debt-to-assets, it includes all types 
of short-term and long-term liabilities. Short-term liabilities also include spontaneous 
financing such as wages payable, utilities and overhead expenses payable, and other 
accounts payable. The persons and/or organisations to whom these accounts are payable 
usually do not ask for collateral or see how many fixed assets the firm have. This may be 
one reason why TGi,t-1 is not significantly related to LEV2.  
 
Table 2 
Results of the Main Effects Model 
Variables 
LEV1 LEV2 
Fixed-effects Random-effects Fixed-effects Random-effects 
SZi,t-1 0.075(0.012)* 0.028(0.004)* 0.071(0.015)* 0.028(0.007)* 
TANGi,t-1 0.09(0.042)** 0.175(0.025)* 0.059(0.049) 0.103(0.034)* 
PROFi,t-1 −0.039(0.04) −0.1(0.035)* −0.165(0.061)* −0.261(0.06)* 
MVBVi,t-1 0.014(0.004)* 0.008(0.003)** 0.017(0.005)* 0.015(0.004)* 
VOLi −0.063(0.017)* −0.002(0.005) 0.03(0.014)** 0.009(0.008) 
NDTSi,t-1 −0.196(0.207) −0.396(0.175)** −0.181(0.263) −0.272(0.229) 
DIVi,t-1 −0.029(0.009)* −0.039(0.009)* −0.023(0.012)** −0.043(0.011)* 
JEi −0.123(0.155) −0.001(0.028) −0.182(0.121) 0.046(0.045) 
Constant −0.169(0.182) −0.029(0.089) 0.125(0.188) 0.269(0.125)** 
      
R2 – Within 0.075 0.052 0.067 0.054 
    - Between  0.087 0.424 0.027 0.343 
    - Overall 0.078 0.345 0.041 0.314 
F-Statistics / Wald Chi2 5.930 (0.00) 367 (0.00) 5.97 (0.000 254 (0.00) 
Hausman - Chi2 25.66 (0.00)  61.91 (0.00)  
 
The second and the third columns show coefficients of these variables from fixed  
and random effects models where the dependent variable is LEV1. Similarly, the fourth 
and the fifth columns show coefficients of the explanatory variables from fixed effects 
and random effects models where the dependent variable is LEV2. Standard errors 
(robust) are reported inside the parentheses. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance 
level at 1 percent level, 5 percent level, and 10 percent level respectively. LEV1 is the 
ratio of long-term debt to total assets whereas LEV2 is the ratio of total debt to total 
assets.  SZ is the natural logarithm of total assets. PROF is the ratio of net income to total 
assets. TG is the value of net fixed assets over total assets. VOL is the coefficient of 
variation of PROF.  MVBV is the ratio of market value per share to book value per share. 
NDTS represents non-debt tax shields and is measured as a ratio of depreciation for the 
year over total assets. DIV is the ratio of dividends divided by net income.  
The economic significance of the relationship between TGi,t-1 and LEV2 is also 
negligible. For example, one standard deviation increase in TGi,t-1will lead to a mere 
0.064 deviations increase in LEV2. 
The results of Table 2 lend mixed support to the pecking order theory. The 
variable PROFi,t-1is significantly related to LEV1 and LEV2 in three regressions at 1 
percent level of significance whereas its coefficient is not significant in the fixed effects 
model where the dependent variable is LEV1. The sign of PROFi,t-1in all regression 
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models is negative which is line with the prediction of the pecking-order theory. 
However, the variable itself has the lowest economic significance among all explanatory 
variables. One standard deviation increase the profitability of a firm relative to total 
assets will reduce LEV1 and LEV2 by only 0.025 and 0.073 standard deviations 
respectively.  
 
Table 3 
Regression Results of Standardised Variables 
 LEV1 LEV2 
Variables Beta Coefficients Beta Coefficients 
SZi,t-1 0.796 0.516 
TGi,t-1 0.141 0.064 
PROFi,t-1 −0.025 −0.073 
MVBVi,t-1 0.105 0.084 
VOLi −0.507 0.164 
NDTSi,t-1 −0.028 −0.018 
DIVi,t-1 −0.067 −0.037 
JEi −0.185 −0.187 
 
Table 3 presents regression results of standardised variables of 370 KSE listed 
firms, regressing leverage ratios on measure of judicial efficiency and other control 
variables. The second and the third columns show coefficients of these variables from 
fixed effects model where the dependent variables are LEV1and LEV2 respectively. LEV1 
is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets whereas LEV2 is the ratio of total debt to total 
assets.  SZ is the natural logarithm of total assets. PROF is the ratio of net income to total 
assets. TG is the value of net fixed assets over total assets. VOL is the coefficient of 
variation of PROF.  GROWTH is the average of annual percentage change in total assets. 
MVBV is the ratio of market value per share to book value per share. NDTS represents 
non-debt tax shields and is measured as a ratio of depreciation for the year over total 
assets. DIV is the ratio of dividends divided by net income.  
The variable MVBVi,t-1 is positively correlated with LEV1 and LEV2 in all fixed-
effects and random-effects models. However, the direction of the relationship becomes 
negative when growth opportunities are measured as the average percentage increase in 
total assets (denoted by the variable GROWTH). This shows that the relationship between 
growth opportunities and leverage is not robust to the alternative proxies of growth 
opportunities. The beta coefficient of MVBVi,t-1 indicates that a positive change of one 
standard deviation will increase LEV1 by 0.105 standard deviations and LEV2 by 0.084 
standard deviations. 
The results of Table 3 indicate that firms with more volatile incomes have lower 
long-term leverage ratios. The coefficient of VOLi is negative in LEV1 regressions and 
positive in LEV2 regressions and the statistical and economic significance of VOLi is 
greater for LEV1 than for LEV2. The results suggest that the volatility of net income-to-
total-assets will negatively influence only long-term leverage, possibly because long-term 
debt has greater default risk than short-term debt, and because return volatility, as one of 
the key sources of default risk, is more a matter of concern for the providers of long-term 
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financing. The positive coefficient of the proxy for return volatility in LEV2 regression 
contradicts the prediction of trade-off theory. VOLi is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level of significance in the regression when the dependent variable is LEV1 and at 
the 5 percent level in the regression when the dependent variable is LEV2. Likewise its 
statistical significance, the economic significance of VOLi is also dramatic for LEV1; for 
example, an increase of one standard deviation in VOLi wills reduce LEV1 by 0.507 
standard deviations. As far as the variable non-debt tax shields (NDTS) is concerned, it is 
almost insignificant in all models. 
Results indicate that firms that pay more in dividends and retain less of their net 
profits have lower leverage ratios. Theoretically, if a firm distributes a higher percentage 
of its net profit in dividends, it will require more outside financing, which according to 
pecking order theory, should be first debt-financing and then equity financing. This way, 
the proxy for dividends (DIVi,t-1) and leverage should be positively correlated. In contrast 
to this line of argument, however, one interesting aspect of the relationship between 
dividends and leverage is highlighted here. Firms that pay dividends are presumably 
profitable firms, while those that do not pay dividends are either less profitable or not 
profitable at all. A firm that is more profitable and distributes less than 100 percent of its 
net income will retain more in rupee terms than a firm that is less profitable or not 
profitable whatsoever. If so, it will need less outside financing than the one that retains 
nothing because of its lower or zero net profit. Resultantly, the relationship between 
dividends and leverage is negative. In the regressions, such a possibility cannot be 
completely ruled out because analysis of the data reveals that there are approximately 30 
percent observations of the total sample where the PROF has value closer to zero or 
below zero. Moreover, out of total sample, dividend is zero in more than 50 percent of 
observations. The average profitability in all these observations is −0.3 percent. Testing a 
relationship between dividends and leverage ratio like the one discussed above requires 
the development of proper interaction terms between profitability and dividends. 
However, since the focus of the present study is on testing the relationship between 
judicial efficiency and leverage, the study leaves testing the above hypothesis to future 
research. 
Finally the influence of judicial inefficiency on leverage ratios of firms included in 
the sample is negative; however, the relationship is statistically insignificant at any 
conventional level. The negative sign of the coefficient of the variable JEi is in 
accordance with the theoretical predictions of this study, but its statistical insignificance 
suggests that its standard error is larger than the acceptable threshold level. This might be 
due to the composition effect i.e. firms in different quartiles of SZ, TG, PROF, MVBV, 
VOL and DIV are not uniformly influenced by the worsening judicial efficiency. To 
explore this possibility, the study partitions the effect of inefficiency of courts on the 
leverage ratios of firms belonging to the four quartiles of the explanatory variables in the 
following set of regressions.  
 
4.3. Results of Regressions with Interaction Terms 
This section discusses the results of regression models that interacted with dummy 
variables based on the quartiles of selected firm attributes with the measure of judicial 
efficiency. The results are reported in Table 4 and Table 5. Table 4 presents results of 
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regression models where the dependent variable is long-term debt-to-total-assets (LEV1) 
and Table 5 presents regression results of regression models where the dependent 
variable is total debt-to-total-assets (LEV2). The heads of the tables display names of the 
explanatory variables for which interaction terms were included to test the differential 
impact of judicial efficiency on the leverage ratios of firms belonging to the four quartiles 
of these variables. The differential impact of each selected variable in the leverage 
equation is estimated with both fixed effects and random effects models. For instance, 
second column of Table 4 shows results obtained interacting SZ quartiles with JE from 
fixed effects model whereas third column shows results of the same interactions from 
random effects model. Standard errors are reported inside the parentheses.  Wald-test is 
also applied to the interaction terms in each regression to test the joint significance of 
these interactions. In all regressions, results of the Hausman test indicate that the null 
hypothesis of no systematic differences in the estimators of fixed and random effects 
models can safely be rejected. Therefore, preferred models would be fixed-effects models 
in this section. 
Since the third quartiles of each variable were dropped, the coefficient of JE shows 
how judicial efficiency affects the leverage decision of firms that are in the 3
rd
 quartile of a 
selected explanatory variable. For example, coefficient of JE in Table 4: Panel A under the 
head of column SZ is actually the slope of the judicial efficiency for firms belonging to the 
third quartile of SZ. Coefficients of the interaction terms like S1*JE, S2*JE and S4*JE are 
the incremental slopes of judicial efficiency above (if coefficient of the interaction term is 
positive) or below (if coefficient of the interaction term is negative) the slope of JE 
(comprehensive discussion on testing and interpreting interaction terms is given in the 
seminal book by Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003). Normal t-test can be used to find 
the statistical significance of these interaction terms.  Details of the variables and tests 
reported in Panel B are given under Panel A of Table 4. Panel B reports the regression 
results where JE was interacted with the dummy variables based on PROF and DIV. 
Results reported in the second and third columns of Table 4: Panel A suggest that 
the coefficients of S1*JE, S2*JE and S4*JE are significantly different from the reference 
category. The Wald-test shows that these interactions terms are jointly significant. 
Specifically, coefficients of the first and the second interacted variables are negative 
while coefficient of the fourth variable is positive indicating that, other things remaining 
constant, leverage ratios of firms belonging to the first and second quartiles of SZ will 
significantly be lower than firms belonging to the third quartile when judicial efficiency 
worsens and, at the same time, leverage ratios of firms belonging to the fourth quartile of 
SZ will significantly be higher than firms in the third quartile. For example, the estimated 
coefficient of JE indicate that with one hundred percentage points increase in JE, 
leverage ratio (LEV1) of a firm belonging to the third quartile of SZ will decrease by 2.9 
percent, whereas the decrease in LEV1 will be 9.4 percent (i.e. (−2.9 percent) + (−6.5 
percent)) and 5.4 percent (i.e. (−2.9 percent) +(−2.5 percent)), for firms in the first 
quartile and the second quartiles respectively [a quick review on obtaining and 
interpreting normal and differential coefficients of interactions terms between dummy 
variables and continuous variables is given in Yip and Tsang (2007)]
1
 
 
1Detailed discussion on the alternative methods of using and interpreting interaction terms is given in 
Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003). 
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Table 4 
Panel A - Regression Results with Interaction Effects 
Variables 
SIZE TANG 
Fixed Random Fixed Random 
SZi,t-1 0.056(0.012)* 0.008(0.005) 0.072(0.012)* 0.027(0.004)* 
TANGi,t-1 0.078(0.041)*** 0.17(0.025)* 0.07(0.042)*** 0.112(0.03)* 
PROFi,t-1 −0.056(0.039) −0.114(0.035)* −0.03(0.039) −0.094(0.034)* 
MVBVi,t-1 0.013(0.004)* 0.008(0.003)** 0.014(0.004)* 0.009(0.003)* 
VOLi −0.069(0.017)* 0.00(0.005) −0.068(0.017)* −0.003(.005) 
NDTSi,t-1 −0.211(0.2) −0.4(0.171)** −0.172(0.203) −0.365(.174)** 
DIVi,t-1 −0.029(0.009)* −0.037(0.008)* −0.029(0.009)* −0.038(0.008)* 
JEi −0.029(0.158) 0.015(0.029) −0.155(0.155) −0.002(0.029) 
S1×JE −0.065(0.019)* −0.046(0.014)*   
S2×JE −0.025(0.01)* −0.018(0.008)**   
S4×JE 0.04(0.012)* 0.045(0.01)*   
T1×JE   −.021(.013)*** −0.026(.011)** 
T2×JE   −0.012(0.008) −0.017(.007)** 
T4×JE   0.034(0.009)* 0.033(0.008)* 
Constant −0.087(0.182) 0.088(0.089) −0.05(0.18) −0.024(0.092) 
R2 - Within 0.0948 0.0684 0.0928 0.0739 
      - Between 0.0854 0.4346 0.1232 0.4237 
      - Overall 0.0786 0.3567 0.1107 0.3534 
F-Statistics/ 5.79(0.00) - 5.19(0.00) - 
Wald Chi2 - 405(0.00) - 383.2(0.00) 
Wald (Joint) 5.04(0.00) 25.1(0.00) 4.36(0.00) 23.82(0.00) 
Hausman - Chi2 39.0(0.00)  26.38(0.00)  
 
Table 4: Panel A, Panel B and Panel C presents results of regression models with 
interaction effects where leverage ratio (LEV1) of 370 KSE listed firms is regressed on a 
measure of judicial efficiency as well as on the interaction terms of JE quartiles of 
explanatory variables. The second and the third columns show coefficients of these 
variables from fixed effects and random effects models where the dependent variable is 
LEV1. Similarly, the fourth and the fifth columns show coefficients of the explanatory 
variables from fixed effects and random effects models where the dependent variable is 
LEV2. Standard errors (robust) are reported inside the parentheses. Symbols *, **, and *** 
indicate significance level at 1 percent level, 5 percent level, and 10 percent level 
respectively.   We include year and industry dummies in each regression. LEV1 is the ratio 
of long-term debt to total assets whereas LEV2 is the ratio of total debt to total assets.  SZ is 
the natural logarithm of total assets. PROF is the ratio of net income to total assets. TG is 
the value of net fixed assets over total assets. VOL is the coefficient of variation of 
PROF.NDTS represents non-debt tax shields and is measured as a ratio of depreciation for 
the year over total assets. DIV is the ratio of dividends divided by net income. 
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Table 4 
Panel B - Regression Results with Interaction Effects 
 Variables 
PROF DIV 
Fixed Random Fixed Random 
SZi,t-1 0.073(0.012)* 0.028(0.004)* 0.074(0.012)* 0.029(0.004)* 
TGi,t-1 0.083(0.042)** 0.167(0.025)* 0.088(0.041)** 0.169(0.025)* 
PROFi,t-1 −0.028(0.04) −0.069(.036)** −0.032(0.039) −0.087(0.035)* 
MVBVi,t-1 0.015(0.004)* 0.01(0.003)* 0.014(0.004)* 0.009(0.003)* 
VOLi −0.065(0.016)* −0.004(.005) −0.063(0.017)* −0.003(0.005) 
NDTSi,t-1 −0.201(0.207) −0.383(.174)** −0.197(0.209) −0.385(0.175)** 
DIVi,t-1 −0.028(0.009)* −0.036(0.008)* −0.029(0.009)* −0.037(0.008)* 
JEi −0.12(0.15) −0.003(0.028) −0.124(0.153) 0.006(0.028) 
P1×JE 0.007(0.008) 0.016(0.008)**   
P2×JE 0.009(0.008) 0.015(0.007)**   
P4×JE −0.017(0.007)** −0.021(0.006)*   
D1×JE   −0.016(0.006)* −0.018(0.005)* 
Constant −0.116(0.178) −0.023(0.091) −0.163(0.181) −0.027(0.09) 
R2 - Within 0.0827 0.0621 0.081 0.0595 
      - Between 0.1012 0.4404 0.0967 0.4251 
      - Overall 0.0913 0.3581 0.0865 0.3465 
F-Statistics/ 5.34(0.00) - 5.73(0.00) - 
Wald Chi2 - 395(0.00) - 372(0.00) 
Wald (Joint) 2.17(0.07) 21.77(0.00) 3.57(0.03) 9.6(0.00) 
Hausman - Chi2 47.43(0.00)  40.39(0.00)  
 
Details of the variables and tests reported in Panel B are given under Panel A of 
Table 4. Panel B reports the regression results where JE was interacted with the dummy 
variables based on VOL and MVBV. 
Interestingly, worsening judicial efficiency has positive impact on the leverage 
ratios of firms belonging to the fourth quartile of SZ. For example, the slope of S4*JE is 
.04 which indicate that one hundred percentage points increase in JE will lead to 1.1 
percent (i.e. −2.9 percent + 4 percent)  increase in the leverage ratio of firms belonging to 
the fourth quartile of SZ. This is an indication that lenders reduce credit to small firms 
and redistribute the same to large firms when judicial efficiency deteriorates. This finding 
has some resemblance to the findings of Gropp, et al. (1997) who used U.S. cross-state 
data to determine the impact of personal bankruptcy laws in various U.S. states in relation 
to lending to low-assets households. They found that lending to households with low-
assets intensity was lower in states with more exemptions than to households with high-
assets intensity. 
These results have also similarity with the findings of Fabbri and Padula (2004) 
who found that inefficient enforcement of credit contracts redistributes credit from poor 
households to wealthy households. These results are robust to whether leverage is 
measured by the ratio of long-term-debt-to-total-assets (LEV1) or the ratio of total-debt-
to-total-assets (LEV2).  Results of the regressions where the dependent variable is LEV2 
are reported in Table 5.  
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Table 4: Panel C 
Regression Results with Interaction Effects 
Variables 
VOL MVBV 
Fixed Random Fixed Random 
SZi,t-1 0.075(0.012)* 0.026(0.004)* 0.075(0.012)* 0.027(0.004)* 
TGi,t-1 0.09(0.042)** 0.179(0.025)* 0.09(0.041)** 0.173(0.025)* 
PROFi,t-1 −0.039(0.04) −0.1(0.034)* −0.051(0.039) −0.111(0.034)* 
MVBVi,t-1 0.014(0.004)* 0.008(0.003)** 0.012(0.004)* 0.004(0.003) 
VOLi −0.008(0.016) 0.01(0.009) −0.07(0.018)* −0.001(0.005) 
NDTSi,t-1 −0.196(0.207) −0.416(0.174)** −0.214(0.208) −0.42(0.177)** 
DIVi,t-1 −0.029(0.009)* −0.04(0.009)* −0.03(0.009)* −0.041(0.009)* 
JEi 0.207(0.087)** −0.013(0.029) −0.107(0.162) 0.013(0.029) 
V1×JE −0.061(0.046) 0.046(0.016)*   
V2×JE −0.398(0.138)* 0.025(0.015)***   
V4×JE −0.261(0.067)* −0.012(0.024)   
M1×JE   −0.042(0.01)* −0.036(0.008)* 
M2×JE   −0.021(0.008)* −0.02(0.007)* 
M4×JE   0(0.007) 0(0.007) 
Constant −0.495(0.22)** −0.081(0.071) −0.156(.184) −0.027(0.029) 
R2– Within 0.0754 0.0537 0.0927 0.0677 
      - Between 0.0876 0.3526 0.0765 0.4255 
      - Overall 0.0783 0.3263 0.0701 0.3518 
F-Statistics/ 5.93(0.00) - 5.51(0.00) - 
Wald Chi2 - 261.3(0.00) - 380.88(0.00) 
Wald (joint) 16.86(0.00) 8.3(0.08) 4.42(0.00) 17.85(0.00) 
Hausman - Chi2 55.1(0.00)  42.1(0.00)  
 
As far as the relevance of tangible assets in the leverage equation is concerned, 
there is some evidence in support of the hypothesis of this study. Results of the fixed-
effects model in Table 4 (Panel A) demonstrate that in the presence of inefficient courts, 
firms in the first quartile of TG will have lower leverage ratios (LEV1) than firms in the 
third quartile, and firms in the fourth quartile of TG will have higher leverage ratios than 
firms in the third quartile. The differential slope of T1*JE and T4*JE are significant at 10 
percent and 1 percent whereas T2*JE is insignificant.  Similar to the results of the main 
effects model, Table 5 (Panel A) shows that there is no clear indication that tangibility 
matters in total-debts-to-total-assets (LEV2) ratio. In all fixed-effects models of the Table 
5 (Panel A), the coefficients of TG are insignificant at conventional levels which implies 
that tangibility does not influence total-debt-to-total-assets ratio when JE is zero. 
Past profitability has explanatory power only in LEV2 regressions as shown in 
Table 5: Panel B. Results of the fixed-effects models in Table 4: Panel B reveal that 
neither the coefficient of PROFi, t-1 nor its interaction terms is significantly different from 
zero. This confirms the results of the main effects model where profitability had a poor 
explanatory power in LEV1 regression. The interaction terms between PROF and JE in 
Panel B of Table 5 imply that one hundred percentage increases in JE will reduce the 
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leverage ratio of a firm in the third quartile of profitability by 5.8 percentage points. 
Similarly, at the same time, firm in the fourth quartile of profitability will have 3.9 
percentage points lower leverage ratio than a firm in the third quartile. These results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that in the presence of poor enforcement of creditors’ 
rights, the problem of information asymmetry and the adverse selection could be severe 
and pecking order theory would strictly hold. However, it is not clear why profitability 
matters in total-debt-to-assets ratio and not in long-term-debt-to-assets ratio.  
To test the relevance of pecking-order theory in less efficient judicial system from 
another angle, the next proxy is DIVi,t-1. According to pecking-order theory, a firm that 
pays higher percentage of its profit in dividends will use more debt-financing. This way 
the relationship between dividends and leverage should be positive. It is important to 
mention that out of the total of 1850 observations in the sample, DIVi,t-1 has a value of 
zero in 928 observations. The average profitability is −0.3 percent in all observations 
where DIVi,t-1 is zero. These results lend support to the earlier postulation that a negative 
relationship may be expected between dividends and leverage if some firms do not pay 
dividends due to losses or zero operating profits while others distribute less than 100 
percent of their net incomes in dividends. Since the values of DIVi,t-1 are zero up to the 
second quartile, all firms were distributed only in two groups: one that pays out dividends 
and the other that does not. D1 in the interaction term represents dummy variable for 
firms that pay dividends whereas the missing category is represented by the coefficient of 
JE. 
Results from both LEV1 and LEV2 (Table 4: Panel B and Table 5: Panel B) 
regressions indicate that in the presence of judicial inefficiency, dividends paying firms 
have lower leverage ratios than those that do not pay dividends. Seemingly odd, but the 
results are line with the pecking-order theory as par the explanation given above. 
As far as volatility of net income is concerned, its sign and significance are not 
stable under different specifications. In LEV1 regressions (Table 4: Panel C), the 
coefficient of VOLi is not statistically significant in the fixed effects model whereas result 
of the Wald-test demonstrate that its interaction terms are jointly insignificant in both 
fixed-effects and random-effects models. In LEV2 regressions, its coefficient and 
interaction terms are insignificant yet again in the random-effects model. Only in the 
fixed effects models of LEV2, results indicate that under poor enforcement of contracts 
firms in the fourth quartile of VOL have lower leverage ratios as compared to the ones in 
the third quartile; and firms in the first quartile of VOL have higher leverage ratios than 
firms in the third quartile. 
The proxy for growth opportunities, MVBV, exhibits very interesting phenomenon. 
Its positive coefficient throughout all specifications contradicts the predictions of the 
agency model developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The results are also 
inconsistent with the argument of Titman and Wessels (1988) who say that growth 
opportunities should not increase leverage because they cannot serve as collateral to 
debts. In fact, the positive coefficient of MVBVi,t-1suggests that in the absence of judicial 
inefficiency, growth opportunities increase leverage. However, when dummy variables 
based on the quartiles of MVBV are interacted with JE, the results show that when faced 
with inefficient judicial system, more growing firms will have lower leverage ratio than 
less growing firms.  
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Table 5: Panel A 
Regression Results with Interaction Effects  
(Using Long-term Debt/Assets as Dependent Variable) 
Variables 
SZ TG 
Fixed Random Fixed Random 
SZi,t-1 0.048(0.016)* 0.007(0.009) 0.077(0.015)* 0.029(0.007)* 
TGi,t-1 0.041(0.048) 0.096(0.034)* 0.09(0.048)*** 0.16(0.038)* 
PROFi,t-1 −0.186(0.06)* −0.276(0.059)* −0.167(0.06)* −0.261(0.059)* 
MVBVi,t-1 0.015(0.005)* 0.014(0.004)* 0.017(0.005)* 0.015(0.004)* 
VOLi 0.022(0.014) 0.011(0.008) 0.029(0.014)** 0.01(0.008) 
NDTSi,t-1 −0.214(0.256) −0.298(0.226) −0.171(0.254) −0.277(0.225) 
DIVi,t-1 −0.023(0.012)** −0.042(0.011)* −0.023(.012)*** −0.043(0.011)* 
JEi −0.057(0.125) 0.081(0.046)*** −0.188(0.123) 0.028(0.045) 
S1×JE −0.09(0.024)* −0.063(0.02)*   
S2×JE −0.056(0.014)* −0.044(0.012)*   
S4×JE 0.037(0.016)** 0.03(0.013)**   
T1×JE   0.073(0.016)* 0.057(0.015)* 
T2×JE   0.04(0.01)* 0.03(0.009)* 
T4×JE   −0.006(0.012) −0.004(0.011) 
Constant 0.231(0.186) 0.395(0.127)* 0.071(0.182) 0.258(0.14)*** 
R2–Within 0.0908 0.0737 0.0885 0.0704 
      - Between 0.0207 0.3327 0.0136 0.339 
      - Overall 0.038 0.3117 0.0294 0.3146 
F-Statistics/ 6.38(0.00) - 6.47(0.00) - 
Wald Chi2 - 280.95(0.00) - 269.6(0.00) 
Wald (joint) 2.17(0.07) 21.77(0.00) 3.57(0.03) 9.6(0.00) 
Hausman - Chi2 65.31(0.00)  100.6(0.00)  
 
Tables 5: Panel A, Panel and B present results of regression models with 
interaction effects where leverage ratio (LEV2) of 370 KSE listed firms is regressed on a 
measure of judicial efficiency, as well as on the interaction terms of JE quartiles of 
explanatory variables. The second and the third columns show coefficients of these 
variables from fixed effects and random effects models where the dependent variable is 
LEV1. Similarly, the fourth and the fifth columns show coefficients of the explanatory 
variables from fixed effects and random effects models where the dependent variable is 
LEV2. Standard errors (robust) are reported inside the parentheses. Symbols *, **, and 
*** indicate significance level at 1 percent level, 5 percent level, and 10 percent level 
respectively. We include year and industry dummies in each regression. LEV1 is the ratio 
of long-term debt to total assets whereas LEV2 is the ratio of total debt to total assets.  SZ 
is the natural logarithm of total assets. PROF is the ratio of net income to total assets. TG 
is the value of net fixed assets over total assets. VOL is the coefficient of variation of 
PROF. NDTS represents non-debt tax shields and is measured as a ratio of depreciation 
for the year over total assets. DIV is the ratio of dividends divided by net income.  
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Table 5: Panel B 
Regression Results with Interaction Effects 
(Using Long-term Debt/Assets as Dependent Variable) 
 Variables 
PROF DIV 
Fixed Random Fixed Random 
SZi,t-1 0.061(0.015)* 0.028(0.007)* 0.07(0.015)* 0.029(0.007)* 
TGi,t-1 0.033(0.047) 0.077(0.034)** 0.055(0.048) 0.093(0.034)* 
PROFi,t-1 −0.128(0.059)** −0.188(0.056)* −0.153(0.06)* −0.24(0.059)* 
MVBVi,t-1 0.021(0.005)* 0.021(0.005)* 0.017(0.005)* 0.015(0.004)* 
VOLi 0.025(0.013)** 0(0.008) 0.03(0.014)** 0.005(0.008) 
NDTSi,t-1 −0.213(0.251) −0.255(0.22) −0.183(0.263) −0.258(0.228) 
DIVi,t-1 −0.02(0.012)*** −0.035(0.011)* −0.023(.012)** −0.04(0.011)* 
JEi −0.192(0.099)** 0.029(0.043) −0.185(0.118) 0.063(0.045) 
P1×JE 0.058(0.01)* 0.071(0.01)*   
P2×JE 0.046(0.008)* 0.055(0.008)*   
P4×JE −0.039(0.011)* −0.046(0.01)*   
D1×JE   −0.028(0.008)* −0.035(0.007)* 
Constant 0.297(0.181)*** 0.133(2.4)* 0.136(0.187) 0.257(0.126)** 
R2 - Within 0.1292 0.1212 0.0783 0.0664 
      - Between 0.1053 0.4161 0.0391 0.3577 
      - Overall 0.1288 0.3838 0.0548 0.3283 
F-Statistics/ 10.27(0.00) - 6.46(0.00) - 
Wald Chi2 - 422.1(0.00) - 290.42(0.00) 
Wald (Joint) 2.17(0.07) 23.47(0.00) 4.21(.03) 8.7(0.014) 
Hausman - Chi2 27.02 (.001)  18.16(.052)  
 
Details of the variables and tests reported in Panel B are given under Panel A of 
Table 5. Panel B reports the regression results where JE was interacted with the dummy 
variables based on PROF and DIV. 
 
4.4.  Robustness Checks 
To check robustness of the results, several alternative methods are employed next.  
 
4.4.1. Results of Regression Involving JE Dummies 
First of these checks is to divide the sample of judicial districts into two groups. 
Group one includes districts where the JE1 is above the 50th percentile while group two 
has districts where JE1 is below the 50th percentile. Using a dummy variable scheme of 
g-1, a dummy variable JED is defined for the first group. This JED variable is interacted 
with the included explanatory variables. The interaction terms will highlight the 
significance of a variable of interest for leverage ratios in districts where judicial 
efficiency is below the 50th
 
percentile. Based on the discussion in the theoretical 
framework section, it is expected that interaction terms involving TG, SZ, and DIV will 
have positive differential slopes whereas PROF, VOL, and MVBV will have negative 
differential slopes. Moreover, the coefficient of the dummy variable JE is expected to be 
negative. Since, almost in all previous regressions, the Hausman test favoured the use of 
fixed-effects models, this section reports only the results of fixed-effects regressions, 
where the dependent variable is LEV1. The results are shown in Table 6. 
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In Table 6, the results indicate that the interaction terms of SZ and TG are 
significant and, as expected, positive. Interaction terms of other variables are either 
insignificant or unexplainable.  
 
Table 6 
Regression with JE Dummies and Interaction Terms 
Variables SZ TG PROF VOL 
SZi,t-1 0.065(0.013)* 0.074(0.012)* 0.073(0.012)* 0.075(0.012)* 
TGi,t-1 0.095(0.041)** 0.074(0.042)*** 0.084(0.042)** 0.09(0.042)** 
PROFi,t-1 −0.05(0.04) −0.031(0.04) −0.042(0.04) −0.039(0.04) 
MVBVi,t-1 0.013(0.004)* 0.014(0.004)* 0.015(0.004)* 0.014(0.004)* 
VOLi −0.03(0.009)* −0.028(0.009)* −0.029(0.009)* −0.029(0.009)* 
NDTSi,t-1 −0.012(0.004)* −0.013(0.005)* −.009(0.004)** −0.174(0.024)* 
DIVi,t-1 −0.202(0.202) −0.203(0.203) −0.199(0.208) −0.196(0.207) 
JED −0.184(0.082)** −0.064(0.039)*** 0.012(0.013) −0.736(0.099)* 
SZ×JED 0.031(0.013)**    
TG×JED  0.119(0.056)**   
PROF×JED   −0.101(0.066)  
VOL×JED    0.175(0.017)* 
Constant −0.59(0.155)* −0.503(.161)* −.537(0.159)* .140(0.08)*** 
      
R2 – Within 0.0813 0.0802 0.0782 0.0754 
      - Between 0.0611 0.1106 0.093 0.0876 
      - Overall 0.0534 0.0973 0.083 0.0783 
F-Statistics 6.42(0.00) - 5.74(0.00) - 
Wald Chi2 - 5.89(0.00) - 5.93(0.00) 
Wald(Joint) 3.17(.04) 2.88(.05) 1.71(.18) 55(0.00) 
 
Table 6 presents results of regression models with interaction effects where total 
leverage/assets ratios (LEV1) of 370 listed firms are regressed on JE which is a dummy 
variable that assumes value of 1 if a given firm has its office in a district where JE value 
is above the 50
th
 percentile. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.  The *, **, 
and *** show statistical significance at 1 percent level, 5 percent level, and 10 percent 
level respectively.  We include year and industry dummies in each regression. LEV1 is 
the ratio of long-term debt to total assets whereas.  SZ is the natural logarithm of total 
assets. PROF is the ratio of net income to total assets. TG is the value of net fixed assets 
over total assets. VOL is the coefficient of variation of PROF.  MVBV is the ratio of 
market value per share to book value per share. NDTS represents non-debt tax shields and 
is measured as a ratio of depreciation for the year over total assets. 
In Table 6, the second column presents result of regression where SZ was 
interacted with JED. The coefficient of the variable SZ shows that under efficient judicial 
system (where JE1 is below the 50th percentile) one unit change in SZ will cause the 
LEV1 ratio of firms to change by 0.065 in the same direction. But under an inefficient 
judicial system (where JE1 is above the 50th percentile) one unit increase in SZ increases 
the LEV1 ratio by 0.095. This is evident from the coefficient of the interaction term 
JED*SZ. The interaction term has a coefficient of 0.031 which indicates that SZ increases 
LEV1 ratio of firms by an additional 3.1 percent in an inefficient judicial system. The 
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coefficient of TG, which is a proxy for firm fixed-assets-to-total-assets, shows similar 
results. The coefficient of the variable TG demonstrates that under efficient judicial 
system (where JE1 is below the 50
th
 percentile) one unit change in TG will cause the 
LEV1 to change by 0.074 positively. However, when the firm is faced with an inefficient 
judicial system (where the JE1 is above the 50th percentile) one unit increase in TG 
increases the LEV1 ratio by a value of 0.193. This 0.193 value is the sum of the 
coefficients of the interaction term TG*JED and TG. The interaction term has a 
coefficient of 0.119 and is significant at 5 percent level of significance. The coefficient of 
the interaction term indicates that TG increases LEV1 ratio of firms by an additional 11.9 
percent in an inefficient judicial system. 
The interaction terms for other variables are either insignificant or show 
inconsistent results.  
 
4.4.2. Banking Courts 
To resolve the issue of non-performing loans of commercial banks, many policy 
measures were taken by the government of Pakistan in the recent past. Among these 
measures, one was to promulgate a new law titled ―The Financial Institutions (Recovery 
of Finance) Ordinance 2001‖. This law chalked out many ways to expedite the recovery 
of non-performing loans. It enabled the financial institutions to foreclose and sale 
collateral property without having to go to court and obtain orders from there. The law 
also allowed the federal government to establish as many banking courts as may be 
required for early and quick resolution of cases related to recovery of loans. 
Presently, there are 29 banking courts in 14 cities. These banking courts handle 
cases related to default on loans by banks’ customers or breach of any terms of the loan 
contract. Where such banks are not existent, the city high court handles cases related to 
recovery of banks’ loans. Since these banks are dedicated solely to handling loans 
recovery cases and other matters related to banks’ loans, it is reasonable to expect that 
creditors (banks) will feel confident that their loan amount would be recovered quickly 
and hence at lower cost. This confidence should increase their willingness to extend 
lending to even smaller firms and firms with little collaterals. Other things being equal, 
this confidence should increase leverage ratios of firms in areas where these courts are 
functional. However, the efficiency of these courts will influence the leverage decisions 
in similar fashion as other courts do.  To check for these possibilities,  the next section 
discuses results from a set of regression models that follow similar methodology as was 
applied in the preceding section, the only difference being the data set used. In these 
regression models, the study uses a judicial efficiency proxy which is based on the 
pending cases of banking courts (JE4). If a banking court is not present in a given city, 
then judicial statists for that city are derived from the high court data files. It is important 
to mention that the banking courts data have some limitations. For example, data on 
pending cases, total cases instituted, and cases resolved are available only for the year 
2006. Such a short period exposes the analysis to the possibility of biasness. Second, 
since most of the companies have their head offices in Karachi, such a single big city can 
potentially reduce variability in data and hence can create huge biasness in the results. In 
previous Section, the study divided the Karachi city in four regions where a high court 
was present in each region. That classification helped in increasing variation in data. But 
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such classification was not possible in the case of banking courts. With all these 
limitations, the study performs this robustness check and hope that it can at least give an 
idea of whether the estimates drawn from the analysis based on data of banking courts 
deviate substantially from earlier results. Results of regression models using banking 
courts data are presented in Panel A and B of Table 7. 
Regression outputs reported in panel A and B of Table 7 show that results drawn 
from banking courts data are almost in line with the main findings of the study. For 
example, the variable SZ and TG have positive coefficients and their interactions terms 
exhibit similar behaviour as their counterparts did in the preceding analysis.  
 
Table 7: Panel A 
Regression Results Interacting Firm Variables with JE based on Data of Banking Courts 
  SZ TG 
Variables Fixed Random Fixed Random 
SZi,t-1 0.052(0.011)* 0.012(0.005)** 0.061(0.011)* 0.027(0.004)* 
TGi,t-1 0.081(0.036)** 0.152(0.022)* 0.064(0.038)*** 0.092(0.027)* 
PROFi,t-1 −0.018(0.023) −0.078(0.024)* −0.004(0.023) −0.07(0.024)* 
MVBVi, t-1 0.01(0.002)* 0.005(0.002)** 0.011(0.002)* 0.006(0.002)* 
VOLi −0.083(0.007)* −0.003(0.005) .059(.014)* −0.004(0.005) 
NDTSi,t-1 −0.051(0.043) −0.058(0.045) −0.045(0.044) −0.051(0.045) 
DIVi,t-1 −0.024(0.008)* −0.032(0.007)* −0.024(0.007)* −0.031(0.007)* 
JEi 0.015(0.013) 0.007(0.009) 0.004(0.013) 0.005(0.01) 
S1×JE −0.038(0.011)* −0.028(0.009)*   
S2× JE −.011(.006)*** −0.006(0.005)   
S4× JE 0.018(0.008)** 0.02(0.006)*   
T1×JE   −0.01(0.008) −0.014(0.006)** 
T2× JE   −0.009(0.004)*** −0.012(0.004)* 
T4× JE   0.027(0.006)* 0.025(0.005)* 
Constant −0.016(0.094) 0.046(0.084) −0.28(0.107)* −0.033(0.091) 
R2 - Within 0.0816 0.0572 0.089 0.0719 
      - Between 0.0957 0.4194 0.1237 0.4093 
      - Overall 0.0913 0.3453 0.1206 0.3428 
F-Statistics 5.27(0.00) - 6.37(0.00) - 
Wald Chi2 - 386(0.00) - 385.94(0.00) 
Hausman - Chi2 16.25(0.234) - 81.75(0.00) - 
 
Table 7 presents results of regression models with interaction effects where 
leverage ratios (LEV1) of 370 listed firms is regressed on, JE which is based on banking 
courts data, firm-specific variables and the interaction terms between JE and quartile 
dummies of firm-specific variables. Standard errors are reported inside the parentheses.  
We include year and industry dummies in each regression. LEV1 is the ratio of long-term 
debt to total assets whereas.  SZ is the natural logarithm of total assets. PROF is the ratio 
of net income to total assets. TG is the value of net fixed assets over total assets. VOL is 
the coefficient of variation of PROF. MVBV is the ratio of market value per share to book 
value per share. NDTS represents non-debt tax shields and is measured as a ratio of 
depreciation for the year over total assets. 
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Table 7: Panel B 
Regression Results Interacting Firm Variables with JE based on Data of Banking Courts 
 PROF DIV 
Variables Fixed Random Fixed Random 
SZi,t-1 0.061(0.011)* 0.026(0.003)* 0.066(0.011)* 0.029(0.004)* 
TGi,t-1 0.081(0.037)** 0.141(0.022)* 0.091(0.036)* 0.15(0.022)* 
PROFi,t-1 0(0.024) −0.04(.023)*** −0.003(0.023) −0.063(0.024)* 
MVBVi, t-1 0.011(0.002)* 0.007(0.002)* 0.01(0.002)* 0.005(0.002)** 
VOLi 0.179(0.066)* 0.001(0.038) 0.067(0.054) −0.005(0.039) 
NDTSi,t-1 −0.065(0.007)* −0.006(0.005) 0.063(0.015)* −0.004(0.005) 
DIVi,t-1 −0.05(0.045) −0.053(0.044) −0.05(0.043) −0.056(0.045) 
JEi −0.022(0.008)* −0.028(0.006)* −0.026(0.008)* −0.032(0.007)* 
SZi,t-1 0.005(0.013) 0(0.009) 0.002(0.013) −0.003(0.009) 
P1×JE 0.009(0.005)** 0.017(0.004)*   
P2×JE 0.009(0.004)** 0.013(0.004)*   
P4×JE −0.016(0.004)* −0.02(0.004)*   
D1×JE   0.01(0.004)** 0.012(0.004)* 
Constant −0.035(0.095) −0.071(0.086) −0.338(0.112)* −0.049(0.084) 
R2 - Within 0.0797 0.0627 0.074 0.0538 
      - Between 0.1329 0.4456 0.1064 0.412 
      - Overall 0.1222 0.3632 0.0982 0.3374 
F-Statistics 5.9(0.00) - 4.99(0.00) - 
Wald Chi2 - 431(0.00) - 374(0.00) 
Hausman - Chi2 157(0.00) - 280.42(0.00) - 
 
Details of the variables and tests reported in Panel B are given under Panel A of 
Table 7. Panel B reports the regression results where JE was interacted with the dummy 
variables based on PROF and DIV. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have investigated both the direct and indirect effects of judicial 
efficiency of district high courts in Pakistan on leverage ratios of 370 KSE-listed firms. 
In the baseline estimation, all important firm-specific determinants of leverage ratios are 
included with the measure of judicial efficiency. The baseline results indicate that 
leverage ratios increase with the size of the firm, ratio of fixed-assets-to-total assets, and 
decreases with profitability, net income volatility, dividends payments and growth 
opportunities. The largest economic effect on leverage ratio is that of the size of a firm. 
The trade-off theory and the information asymmetry theory appear to be best explaining 
leverage ratios. Interestingly, the judicial inefficiency does not have any statistically 
significant association with leverage ratios. This might be due to the composition effect 
which means that judicial efficiency does not influence all firms alike. To check for such 
a possibility, differential slopes were estimated by interacting the measure of judicial 
efficiency with dummy variables that were based on the quartiles of the included 
explanatory variables. Results of these regressions show that worsening judicial 
efficiency increases leverage ratios of large firms and decrease leverage ratios of small 
firms which is an indication that creditors shift credit away from small firms to large 
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firms in the presence of inefficient judicial system. Results also indicate that the effect of 
inefficient courts is greater on leverage ratios of firms that have fewer tangible assets as a 
percentage of total assets than on leverage ratios of firms that have more tangible assets. 
And finally there is some evidence that firms with more volatile net incomes are affected 
more than firms with less volatile net incomes when judicial efficiency decreases.  
 
Policy Implications 
Findings of this study have important policy implications concerning the 
development of the capital market in Pakistan. Results indicate that overall level of 
leverage in the economy is not affected by inefficiency of the judicial system. However, 
this does not mean that judicial efficiency has no impact on leverage ratios. The results 
indicate that under inefficient judicial system creditors reduce their lending to small firms 
and firms with little collateral and redistribute the credit to large firms. This is why 
judicial inefficiency does not change volume of credit, but changes distribution of the 
credit. These findings show the importance of judicial efficiency for small firms in 
determining their optimal capital structures. Being unable to borrow and achieve 
optimum capital structure, small firms lose an important and inexpensive source of 
capital. Small firms play a pivotal role in the development of a country. If these firms 
face difficulty in obtaining cheaper source of financing, their growth opportunities remain 
limited, this in turn may negatively influence economic development of the country. 
These results also have implications for the diversification of loan portfolios of the 
banking sector. Under inefficient judicial system the banks’ loan portfolios will have 
greater percentage of investment held in large firms. This engenders two main issues 
regarding diversification of loan portfolios. First, the banks’ loan portfolios will remain 
undiversified across different sizes of firms and across firms with different collateral 
ratios. Second, and the most important one, is that lending to large firms will concentrate 
large amounts in fewer loans. This will violate the golden principle of banks in 
diversification ―small loans to large number of borrowers‖. 
The poor state of judicial efficiency warrants quick resolution of pending cases at 
all levels of the high courts. However, given the dynamics of the institutional settings and 
resource endowments, it is not likely to happen soon or easily.  Alternatively, the 
government can focus specifically on improving the efficiency of banking courts. This 
alternative is comparatively less resource-intensive as banking is limited in number. The 
government can also increase the number of banking courts and extend this facility to 
cities where such courts are non-existent. This will not only lighten the burden on the 
existing courts, but will also send a positive signal to fund suppliers that they can easily 
recover their funds through these courts should the borrower default.  
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